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Asbtract. 
 
New solutions to the basic standard New Keynesian model are explored. I extend De Grauwe’s 
model (2012), distinguishing two types of agents and different expectations rules. The central bank 
fixes the rate of interest. Families and firms determine aggregated demand and supply. Neither of 
them follows the hypothesis of perfect rational expectations. However, Popper’s principle of 
rationality is applied. From a situation of limited information, even though they learn through 
rational processes, they are unable to understand their mutual behaviour. Therefore, the 
expectations in the three equations do not coincide. As a result, the solution does not tend to a 
single, stationary equilibrium. This conclusion does not depend on the hypothesis of the "animal 
spirits". Finally, the possibility of a successful learning process is studied. It is considered whether 
the central bank could learn from the data, finally reaching a stationary optimum equilibrium. The 
answer is no. The New Keynesian model seems to be basically unstable when agents have limited 
information. The problem lies in the impossibility to get adequate coordination.  
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1. Object. 
 
The basic New Keynesian model has been proposed, among other authors, by Woodford (2001a, 
2003), Gali (2008b), De Grauwe (2012). This model is one of the contemporary mainstream macro 
models. In general, New Keynesian theory puts together two ideas, the structure of the Real 
Business Cycle theory, with the Keynesian proposal that there are imperfect competition and 
nominal rigidities (Milani, 2012). Consequently, these models try to give coherence to two different 
ideas. One is equilibrium and markets clearance. So the business cycle should come from 
exogenous stochastic shocks. And the other, staggered wages, price contracts and the relevance of 
monetary policy (De Vroey and Malgrange, 2011, pp. 18-19). 
 
In this paper, I consider De Grauwe`s (2012) model. In order to give reason of business cycles, De 
Grauwe develops the hypothesis of animal spirits (conceptually similar to the hypothesis of 
sunspots). The animal spirits hypothesis attempts to explain the economic cycles in GDP and 
employment on the basis of economic agents that have imperfect information and bounded 
rationality. Self-fulfilling non-fundamental stochastic shocks to beliefs are proposed to give reason 
of endogenous economic cycles, for example, Farmer and Guo (1994) and Benhabib and Farmer 
(1994). First, agents would apply simple rules to predict the future. Then they would check their 
results: they would compare them with data. The predictions would be modified according to the 
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achieved success. Finally, the agents would move through waves of optimism/pessimism. 
 
I analyse the solution of a modified De Grauwe’s model (2012). First, only the deterministic model 
is taken into consideration. Second, two types of agents are distinguished. Third, these agents have 
got different expectations rules. Fourth, expectations in the formation of interest rates are 
introduced. Now these rates are not moved by actual output gap, but by the expected output gap. 
Nor by actual inflation rate, but by the expected inflation (Galí 2008, p.79). 
 
Deterministic model means that this New Keynesian standard model is analysed to study the 
business cycles that it would generate by itself, without the need to introduce the hypothesis of the 
animal spirits. Even removing the random disturbances. In De Grauwe's (2012) model, expectations 
are not formed rationally and there are waves of optimism and pessimism. This assumption does not 
intervene in this work, which analyses the model and does so based on the two simple ways of 
predicting that De Grauwe (2012) considers. 
 
There are fundamentalist and extrapolative rules. Therefore, the hypothesis of rational expectations 
is not used. A fundamentalist rule is one that expects the variable to reach equilibrium at t + 1. An 
extrapolative rule is one which determines what will happen to the variable in t + 1 from what 
happened in t - 1. 
 
There are two types of agents, each of which decides some equations of the model. Each type of 
agent uses a different formation of expectations. They ignore how the other makes decisions, 
though they try to anticipate these rules. Therefore, an agent believes the other one follows the same 
structure of decision. All in all, agents only know their own expectations, and they expect everyone 
else to be using the same rule. 
 
From this initial point, it is studied if it generates a single, stable and stationary equilibrium. 
Consequently, if the model induces cushioned cycles that lead to that equilibrium over time. Mitra 
and Bullard (2000): the monetary policy rules should generate models with a determinate rational 
expectations’ equilibrium. Also, when the agents, and crucially the central bank, perform a learning 
process, and they do not follow rational expectations, their recursive learning process should 
generate this rational expectations’ equilibrium (Mitra and Bullard, 2000).  
 
I consider the existence of learning processes which could modify the conclusions obtained. Both 
sets of agents can learn: they try to contrast the evolution of variables with what they expected to 
happen. They learn through econometric estimation, as in Sargent (1993). 
 
 
2. Basic New Keynesian model and the specification in De Grauwe (2012) 
 
The basic New Keynesian model consists of an aggregate demand equation (IS curve, derived from 
the Euler equation for consumer optimization), an aggregate supply equation (price setting rule for 
the monopolistic firms) and a rule for setting the interest rate, usually a formulation of the Taylor 
rule. E.g. Evans and Honkapohja (2003). 
 
Within this family of models is the De Grauwe’s system (2012, pp. 3-4). 
 
yt  = a1 Etyt+1      +  (1 - a1) yt-1   +  a2 (rt - Etπt+1) + ξ1       (1) 
πt  = b1 Etπt+1    +  (1 - b1) πt-1    +  b2 yt                     + ξ2       (2) 
rt    = c1 (πt - π*) +  c2 yt + c3 rt-1                                       + ξ3       (3) 
 
Where yt is the output gap, Et means expectation, rt is the nominal interest rate,  is the inflation 
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rate, * is the target inflation rate (normalized to 0).   is white noise (normally distributed, mean 
zero, constant standard deviation). Hetzel (2013) analyses the ECB's policy with a similar model. 
White noise will be excluded from the analysis. 
 
In the New Keynesian model, equations (1) and (2) determine the evolution of the inflation rate, 
given the development of the output gap. As well as the movement in this output gap based on the 
change in the real interest rate (Galí, 2008, p.49). The differences between Galí (2008) and De 
Grauwe (2012), in these equations, are given in De Grauwe's introduction of the lagged variables. 
In addition, De Grauwe dispenses with the natural interest rate. In Galí (2009), for example, the 
natural interest rate is subtracted, together with the expectation of future inflation, to the current 
interest rate (p.3). This type of natural interest is introduced because the output gap appears as the 
difference between observed and natural. Natural output gap would be the level prevailing if all 
prices were flexible (Gali, 2008b, p.48) and markets were clearing. Equation (3) contains the 
fixation of the nominal interest rate by the monetary authority.  
 
The natural interest rate seems to vary (Carlstrom and Fuerst, 2016) and a possible solution is to 
subtract from the interest rate only the expectation of inflation, given that, in the calibration of the 
model, the variables appear in terms of variables without trend. In theory, it is feasible. In practice, 
it requires the employment of the exact procedure to remove the trend. But this choice is theoretical 
and not testable (Kikut and Muñoz, 1994, p.5). This discussion is not the object of this work. This 
election does not seem to change the conclusions obtained here. 
 
 
3. The modified model. 
 
In the model, the following variation has been introduced. In equation (3) the interest rate ceases to 
depend on πt and yt, to become dependent on Eπt+1, Eyt+1. Double expectation is introduced 
regarding inflation and output gap. 
 
rt = c1 (Etπt+1 – π*) + c2 Etyt+1 + c3 rt-1 + ut        (3)’ 
 
Now the model has three non-predetermined variables: output gap, inflation rate and interest rate3.  
 
For example, among others, Woodford (2001b); Galí (2008, pp. 79-81); Clarida, Galí, and Gertler 
(2000) estimate a forward-looking Taylor rule where inflation and output gap expectations are 
introduced (p.150). Also, Mitra and Bullard (2000, p.8), who consider that expectations are formed 
in the same way in all equations, that is, all agents share them, and use identical calculation 
algorithms and the same algorithms to learn and reformulate those expectations (pp. 9 and 24). 
Likewise, expectations could be formed in four ways (current data, data with delays, expectations 
regarding the future, expectations regarding the present). 
 
 
4. Two types of agents. 
 
There are two types of agents. On the one hand, the planning agent or central bank (CB), which 
establish the monetary policy: it sets the nominal interest rate. On the other hand, the representative 
agent (RA) that decides the aggregate supply and demand. Therefore, the model differentiates 
between those who decide monetary policy (CB) and those who develop supply and demand 
                                                 
3 Following Buiter (1983): a non-predetermined variable is one for which its current value is a function of the 
expectation we have in the present, about the future values of endogenous and exogenous variables. Then they can 
respond instantly to changes in expectations. Any modification in expectations generates immediate adjustments in 
output gap, inflation and interest rate. 
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decisions (RA). Both can follow different rules for predicting the relevant macroeconomic 
variables. They do not have rational expectations. Or, at least, not necessarily. 
 
The model can be classified as a 'bottom-up model' (De Grauwe, 2010): all agents have cognitive 
limitations and limited information. Although they learn from experience. 
 
 
5. Expectations.  
 
Agents do not form expectations rationally. Where rational expectations mean that subjective 
probability distribution is equal to objective probability distribution (weak form), e.g. Tesfatsion 
(2018), p.2. Additionally, agents know all the information known to the modeller (strong form, op. 
cit., p.4). That is, agents would have every relevant piece of information about expectations, 
deterministic exogenous variables, properties of the probability distributions, realized values for all 
endogenous variables and stochastic exogenous variables (p.4).   
 
Evans and Honkapohja (2002) divide the rules for setting interest rates between rules based on 
fundamentals and rules based on expectations. The rules based on fundamentals are fixed in relation 
to white noise processes and, sometimes, lagged output gap. The rules based on expectations also 
suggest a relationship with the expected output gap and inflation rate. It is not exactly the 
distinction of this work, since the expectations are fixed previously, and they decay into some rule 
of formation of those predictions. Evans and Honkapohja (1999) distinguish three learning rules. 
Eductive learning, adaptive learning and rational learning. Eductive is conditional on the continuous 
application of rational expectations hypothesis (applying the true mathematical conditional 
expectations), so the solution converges towards rational expectations. Adaptive learning depends 
on iterative regression procedures. There is no guarantee to reach that rational expectations solution.  
 
I propose a model where agents neither form expectations rationally (in this sense), nor know every 
relevant factor necessarily. A model where limited information is a central characteristic. The two 
types of agents try to make the best forecasts, attempting to anticipate the other agents’ 
expectations, but without having an exact knowledge of them.  
 
Popper’s principle of rationality applies:  “The rationality principle states that each agent acts 
adequately or appropriately to her situation as she sees it, given her aims” (Frederick, 2013, p. 62, 
explaining Popper’s ideas). In this sense, a rational agent is able to improve his initial theory, or 
even to act in a way which conflicts with this initial theory, in order to adapt more efficiently to the 
situation (op. cit., p. 66).  
 
Following De Grauwe (2012), there are two rules to determine the evolution of economic variables. 
Fundamentalist rule: the agents estimate the steady state value of the output gap (normalized at 0) 
and they use it to predict the future output gap. 
 
Et
F yt+1 = y* = 0                                (4) 
 
In relation to the inflation rate, the announced inflation target is considered to be credible. They 
believe the objective will be attained. 
 
Et
F t+1 = *            (5) 
 
Extrapolative rule. The agents do not know or do not believe in the steady-state output gap. They 
extrapolate the previous observed output gap into the future. This is a type of adaptive expectations. 
They predict by inductive experience. 
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Et
e yt+1 = yt-1            (6) 
Et
e t+1 = t-1            (7) 
 
The CB hesitates between three policies: applying a fundamentalist rule regarding the output gap 
and inflation rate, or applying it only to one of those two variables. It may fix the interest rate on the 
basis of confidence: controlling the inflation rate, the national income can be maintained close to its 
trend or natural value. Or it may deem the evolution of the output gap to be the only relevant task. 
The inflation target would be immediately achieved, due to the CB’s credibility. I analyse the three 
possibilities. 
 
The RA builds expectations by the extrapolative rule. There is no confidence that the CB will 
maintain any fundamentalist objective. They thus take into account the past evolution in order to 
determine the evolution of aggregate supply and demand. But the interest rate continues to be 
decided by the CB. 
 
CB and RA are not aware that they do form their expectations differently. They do not know the 
real rule of formation of expectations, although they understand that it is possible that it does not 
coincide with the assumptions. 
 
 
6. Some additional considerations about the scientific literature: the New Keynesian model 
and the effectiveness of monetary policy. 
 
De Grauwe (2012) states that, when the private sectors of the economy are forward looking, there 
are two difficulties that the monetary policy of the central bank must face (Evans and Honkapohja, 
2002, p.7). First, that the rules of monetary policy and the expectations of agents can generate a 
disequilibrium. Second, that those rules could lead to the indeterminacy of equilibrium: multiple 
equilibria with rational expectations. The economy would not reach the optimum. However, these 
authors conclude that if the interest rate rule is carefully designed, there is no indetermination or 
disequilibrium. 
 
Galí (2008) analyses the mathematical conditions so that the standard New Keynesian model has a 
determinate equilibrium. The model proposed here differs from that structure, because it follows De 
Grauwe (2012), and also because the expectations of equation (3)' may not coincide with the 
expectations of the other two equations (1) and (2). 
 
Evans and Honkapohja (2003), based on the fact that agents do not have perfect rational 
expectations, consider whether a stable and optimal equilibrium is attained. That is, if that 
equilibrium is achieved and if it is the same as what would exist if all the agents had perfect rational 
expectations. The answer they obtain is the following, if the CB sets rules based on expectations 
and the expectations of the private agents are correctly considered, that optimal equilibrium is 
necessarily reached. 
 
There is an open debate about the effectiveness of monetary policy regarding the output gap. 
Applying a Taylor rule, Galí (2008) comes to a double conclusion, similar to Woodford (2001b). 
That a policy that is very active to control the output gap reduces the utility of the representative 
consumer, because it increases the variance of the output gap and inflation (p.83). Especially when 
the coefficient takes values as high as unity (p. 84). And second, that the monetary authority 
achieves lower welfare losses when it responds only to movements in the inflation rate, and the less 
the greater that response. “Hence, and at least in the context of the basic New Keynesian model 
considered here, a simple Taylor-type rule that responds aggressively to movements in inflation can 
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approximate arbitrarily well the optimal policy” (p.84). The central bank or planner would not take 
into account the state of the economic cycle in the national income. In the same way, Mitra and 
Bullard (2000) recommend monetary policies with little or no reaction to the output gap (p.5). 
Clarida, Galí and Gertler (2000) consider that the coefficient that multiplies the inflation rate must 
be higher than 1, otherwise the policy would open the possibility of 'bursts of inflation and output 
that result from self-fulfulling changes in expectations' (p.178). 
 
De Grauwe (2008, pp. 28-30) considers this possibility. Unlike Galí (2008) and Woodford (2001b), 
De Grauwe concludes that the intensity of the economic cycle increases. This would be due to the 
animal spirits hypothesis. Consequently, De Grauwe (2012) defends that a monetary policy that 
considers only the control of inflation is not an optimal policy (“strict inflation targeting is unlikely 
to be optimal”, p. 69). 
 
Modifying Taylor's equation by introducing expectations regarding the future, together with the 
fundamentalist formation of these expectations of the CB with respect to the output gap, is 
equivalent to centering the CB's performance around exclusively the objective of the inflation rate, 
within an economy that moves through extrapolative movements.  
 
The conclusion reached in this work is: a monetary policy which is active regarding inflation, 
neutral with respect to the output gap, could produce, in the context of the New Keynesian analysis, 
practically recurrent economic cycles. It is necessary for the CB to place the output gap also as the 
objective of its control. Therefore, I obtain a conclusion similar to De Grauwe (2012). On the otrher 
hand, in a New Keynesian model, a policy considering the control of output gap, but not the 
evolution of the inflation rate, could produce explosive cycles (without a stable solution). 
 
Finally, monetary policy should be considered in the context of a complex social and economic 
system, where agents make decisions with limited information. Equilibrium is not assured. Learning 
is not a feasible solution, since agents may face a serious problem of omitted variables. Agents 
should reconsider the variables in que equations, but nothing guarantees this will be the result.  
 
 
7. Calibration and data. 
 
The values used are usually: a1 = 0.5. a2=-0.2. b1= 0.5. b2=0.05. c1=1.5. c2=0.5. c3=0.5 (De Grauwe, 
2012, Galí 2008, among others). Mitra and Bullard (2000) lower b2 to 0.024. Taylor's (1993) initial 
estimates were 1.5 (c1) y 0.5 (c2). With a constant coefficient of 0.04 and a 2% inflation target. 
 
Mitra and Bullard (2000), in a model without lagged variables use the following calibration in 
relation to c1 and c2: They must be between 0 and 4. If the coefficient that multiplies the inflation 
rate is greater than 1, it would be an active rule (p.13). The value of the coefficient of response to 
inflation should be above 1, so that the original model has a certain solution (Gali, 2008b, p.22). 
The values of 1.5 and 0.5 (0.5/4 for quarterly values) would be approx. Consistent with the 
variations observed in the type of the Federal Reserve in the Greenspan period (Gali, 2008b, p.52). 
However, 'Response to inflation deviations (...) should be 1.5, and the response to output deviations 
(...) should be 1' (Carlstrom and Fuerst, 2016, p.2). 
 
The introduction of the exchange rate (with a delay) appears in many researchs as a relevant factor 
(Nelson, 2000). In this paper, it is not important to introduce new variables, given that the object of 
study is the evolution of the model and its stability, rather than the strict econometric adjustment to 
data. 
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Next, I simulate the cyclical behavior of the UK economy. Data taken from the Bank of England4. 
The Hodrick-Prescott filter is applied in such a way that the output gap, the inflation rate and the 
interest rate equal zero on average (1830-1900). De Grauwe and Ji (2016) also use this HP filter and 
find a high correlation among the GDP growth rates of the eurozone countries. The behaviour of the 
three variables is simulated from 1900 on.  
 
8. The solution generated by the model. 
 
When values are given to expectations operators, the general model becomes concrete (decays) and 
takes specific values. The initial model has non-predetermined variables, but once the expectations 
in past or present values are specified, the model stops having them. As expectations can be 
fundamentalist or extrapolative (adaptive), the model lapses into six basic cases. 
 
Determinate solutions are considered in the models: if the solution is unique, stable and stationary, 
for the three endogenous variables considered, output gap, inflation rate and interest rate. The 
condition is that all eigenvalues are in the unit circle (eg, Galí, 2008). 
 
Case A, the model contains rational expectations. In consequence, expectations coincide with the 
actual values. 
 
yt = a1 yt + (1 - a1) yt-1 + a2 (rt - πt) + ξ1        (1a) 
πt = b1 πt + (1 - b1) πt-1+ b2 yt + ξ2         (2a) 
rt = c1 (πt - π*) + c2 yt + c3 rt-1 + ξ3         (3a) 
 
Case B. All expectations are resolved in an adaptive way: extrapolative. 
 
yt = yt-1 + a2 (rt - πt-1) + ξ1          (1b) 
πt = πt-1 + b2 yt + ξ2           (2b) 
rt = c1 (πt-1 - π*) + c2 yt-1 + c3 rt-1 + ξ3         (3b) 
 
Case C. All expectations are fundamentalists. 
 
yt = (1 - a1) yt-1 + a2 (rt - π*) + ξ1         (1c) 
πt = b1 * + (1 - b1) πt-1+ b2 yt + ξ2         (2c) 
rt = c3 rt-1 + ξ3            (3c) 
 
The following three cases distinguish between types of agents. Private agents (RA) decide on the IS 
and Phillips curve equations and they do so extrapolatively. They do not believe that the CB 
manages to maintain the objectives of the monetary policy and prefer to value the past data. The CB 
decides on the third, setting the interest rate according to different definitions of expectations. 
 
In case D, the CB is fundamentalist, with respect to the inflation rate and output gap. 
 
yt  =  yt-1 + a2 (rt - πt-1) + ξ1          (1d) 
πt  =  πt-1+ b2 yt + ξ2           (2d) 
rt   =  c3 rt-1 + ξ3           (3d) 
 
Case E. The CB is fundamentalist with respect to the output gap. 
 
                                                 
4 Three Centuries of Data, http://www.bankofengland.co.uk/research/Pages/onebank/threecenturies.aspx. DD is 
domestic demand, in constant 1900 prices, from Mitchell (1988). RAT is Bank of England Rate. CPI is consumer prices 
index, from ONS (O'Donoghue et al (2004)). 
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yt =  yt-1 + a2 (rt - πt-1) + ξ1          (1e) 
πt =  πt-1+ b2 yt + ξ2           (2e) 
rt  =  c1 (πt - π*) + c3 rt-1 + ξ3          (3e) 
 
Case F. The CB is fundamentalist in relation to the inflation rate. 
 
yt = yt-1 + a2 (rt - πt-1) + ξ1          (1f) 
πt = πt-1+ b2 yt + ξ2           (2f) 
rt  = c2 yt + c3 rt-1 + ξ3           (3f) 
 
Assuming that the values are normalized to * = 0, for example accepting the trend calculated by 
HP filter as the interest rate target, model A contains the following solution. 
 
2
1 2 2 1 1 1
2 1 1 1 1
1 3 1 1
0 0
0 0 0
1 0 0
t t t
t t t
t t t
a a a y a y
b b b
c c r c r

  

−
−
−
 −       
       
− = +       
       − −        
         (4) 
 
A zt =
  B zt-1+            (5) 
 
zt = A
-1 B zt-1 + A
-1            (6) 
 
With the calibration used, models A, B and C have vectors A-1B with eigenvalues less than unity. 
This generates damped oscillations, and the system tends to a stable and unique equilibrium in yt = 
0, t = 0. 
 
I simulate the values over the next 50 years, from the values in 1900 for the British economy. DD * 
is the cycle of the output gap once the trend calculated by the HP filter has been subtracted. CPI * is 
for the inflation rate. RAT * for the nominal interest rate. 
 
A Model. Rational expectations.
-4
-3.5
-3
-2.5
-2
-1.5
-1
-0.5
0
0.5
1
1.5
1 10 19 28 37 46
DD*
CPI*
RAT*
 
 
However, if monetary policy ceases to have the simultaneous control over the evolution in the 
output gap (c2 = 0), then explosive cycles are generated. 
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A model, c2 = 0
-10
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1 10 19 28 37 46
DD*
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Model B follows exactly the same dynamic, with a stationary equilibrium solution, unless monetary 
policy ignores the evolution of the output gap. Model C shows that if everyone followed 
fundamentalist expectations, the economy would quickly drift towards stable stationary equilibrium. 
 
C model. Fundamentalist expectations.
-2.5
-2
-1.5
-1
-0.5
0
1 10 19 28 37 46
DD*
CPI*
RAT*
 
 
The model D leads to an explosive solution. The system does not tend to a stationary equilibrium. 
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D Model. Fundamentalist CB.
-300
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One of the three eigenvalues is greater than one. The system is explosive when interest rates do not 
respond neither to the inflation rate, nor to the output gap, and yet private agents have no 
confidence in that monetary policy and its effectiveness. Therefore, the New Keynesian model 
discards a policy of constant, autonomous growth of the money supply and prefers an active policy. 
(Galí considers this type of monetary rule to be non-adequate in front of monetary demand shocks, 
2008, pp. 84-85).  
 
Cases E and F. The CB's sole objective is either the inflation rate (E) or the output gap (F). 
 
E model. Fundamentalist CB for output 
gap.
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F model. Fundamentalist CB for inflation 
rate.
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When the CB pursues only the inflation target (E model), recurring cycles can be produced. Since 
two of the eigenvalues of the matrix take a value of approximately 1 (0.99971). If the CB 
establishes an objective of output gap (F model), it can cause values of output gap and rate of 
inflation that progressively move away from equilibrium. In addition, in the E model, if the CB 
increases the weighting of the lagged interest rate, softening its monetary policy more, then the 
matrix of the E model happens to have two eigenvalues above 1. Not so for F model. 
 
Three conclusions. First, the New Keynesian model is stable under rational expectation, under the 
usual calibration. This is under the assumption that all agents are the same, since all of them know 
the exact model (De Grauwe, 2008, p. 42). Second, the New Keynesian model must set monetary 
objectives of inflation rate and output gap. Because it is possible that monetary policy is not 
credible and economic agents maintain rules such as extrapolative, among other possible. Third, the 
New Keynesian model can generate unstable situations, with a progressive distancing from an 
equilibrium situation in output gap and inflation. This is due to the possible lack of coordination 
among economic agents. This is a similar situation to that considered by Evans and Honkapohja 
(2006, p. 25): if agents try to forecast through adaptive learning, but the central bank applies a rule 
based on the presumption of being in the stationary rational equilibrium. 
 
 
9. The impact of learning. Does learning converge towards the perfectly rational expectations 
equilibrium?. 
 
I focus on models E and F. The difference of agents and expectations rules may generate recurrent 
cycles, even explosive ones. A possible solution would be found in learning. The possibility of 
reaching a single stationary equilibrium through experience must be analysed. If the agents 
understood that they have different patterns of behaviour, and their expectations followed suit, they 
would approach the real behavior of the other agents. The end would be the stability under the 
rational expectations equilibrium: A model. 
 
Evans and Honkapohja (2002) establish a double criterion for valuing learning models. First, if with 
rational expectations, the system gives a single stationary solution. If so, then the model is 
determinate. Second, if with adaptive learning, usually by simple regression, this stationary solution 
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would be stable, that is to say reached asymptotically, through this learning process. Solution that 
would coincide with the result of rational expectations. The learning process is considered by Evans 
and Honkapohja (2006) as the minimisation of a quadratic loss function. To obtain the minimal 
values for the deviations of the output gap and the inflation rate, once a discount factor is applied. 
This type of learning is necessarily based on the knowledge of every relevant factor working in the 
economic system. If there is just one factor not considered, the minimisation cannot be succesful, 
since it is trying to get a minimal value of a deviation whose determinants are not known. A 
completely different approach from the point of view maintained in this work. I consider the 
possibility of uncertainty over the variables taking place in the system, due to unknown 
expectations. 
 
The analysis carried out of the New Keynesian model has shown that, if rational expectations are 
maintained, it is determinate under a usual calibration (A model). When it is assumed that the 
agents are able to accurately anticipate the expectations of the other agents: their subjective 
expectation equals objective facts. 
 
This second question is the one posed here for cases E and F, in which the CB, based on a situation 
of limited information, has decided not to react to the output gap, or to the inflation rate. Not taking 
into account thar the RA is reacting to the lagged output gap and the lagged inflation rate, CB’s 
model forgets relevant variables and CB tries to know and control the whole economic system with 
this omission of variables. 
 
Here, the agents know the model's structure. However, they do not know the exact value of the 
parameters, nor do they know what other agents will do and so they try to predict the reciprocal 
expectations rules. In addition, they do not have a complete list of variables, because the variables 
depend on the expectations rules.  
 
In this context, the CB's role in deciding monetary policy is crucial. 
 
Learning is given by econometric methods: the different agents perform an estimation by simple 
linear regression or by two-stage least squares (2SLS). For example, Marcet y Sargent (1988). The 
agents could learn in other ways, minimising the differences between the expected and the 
perceived values. But the most powerful method must be the result of econometric theory. The 
objective is to know if, applying the best methods, the agents manage to approximate the balance of 
rational expectations in time. 
  
The agents estimate from their original assumptions. It makes no sense that their estimation is made 
on factors not considered or from a different structure. This would be an attack on the assumption of 
limited information. Economic theory must study real agents in actual conditions, not omniscient 
individuals. Therefore, individuals are rational (Popper’s principle): they adapt in the best way, but 
their knowledge is limited. 
 
In model E, taking into consideration 20 simulated data, the agents reach the following estimate. 
The RA estimates: 
 
yt =  yt-1       –  0.2 (rt - t-1)          (7) 
t =  t-1      +  0.05 yt           (8) 
rt  = 1.5 t-1 + 0.07389 yt-1  +  0.5 rt-1         (9) 
 
Estimation by simple linear regression5: 
                                                 
5 Easyreg program. 2SLS does give very similar results. 
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Y = DDE Coefficient t Student Y = CPIE Coefficient t Student Y = CPIE Coefficient T Student 
X(1) = 
RATE-
LAG1[CPIE] -0.2 
-
3624974551 
X(1) = 
LAG1(CPIE) 1 11470054239 
X(1) = 
LAG1[CPIE] 1.4926108 366733003 
X(2) = 
LAG1[DDE] 1 2.319E+10 X(2) = DDE 0.05 1419710077 
X(2) = 
LAG1[DDE] 0.0738916 428474123 
            
X(3) = 
LAG1[RATE] 0.4926108 357242109 
n 20     20     20   
RSS 0     0     0   
R2 1     1     1   
R*2 1     1     1   
 
This model is called, in the scientific literature, the perceived law of motion (PLM). The E model, 
as such, is the ALM (actual law of motion). The problem is about minimising the distance between 
the data and the prediction from the theoretical equations that express what you believe it is 
happening. This is equivalent to trying to reduce business cycles. 
 
The CB estimates, on the other hand: 
 
yt = 0.998980 yt-1      – 0.132125 rt          (10) 
t = t-1     + 0.05 yt           (11) 
rt = 1.5 t  + 0.5 rt-1           (12) 
 
This is its PLM, with a very significative regression (simple linear regression).  
 
Y = DDE Coefficient 
t 
Student Y = CPIE Coefficient t Student Y = CPIE Coefficient t Student 
X(1) = 
LAG1(DDE) 0.998980 3397.44 
X(1) = 
LAG1(CPIE) 1 11470054239 X(1) = CPIE 1.5 2853592722 
X(2) = 
RATE -0.132125 -531.15 X(2) = DDE 0.05 1419710077 
X(2) = 
LAG1[RATE] 0.5 2784056642 
N 20     20     20   
RSS 0.00021     0     0   
R2 1     1     1   
R*2 1     1     1   
 
From the estimation, private agents would continue to be extrapolative, believing that the CB reacts 
actively against deviations of the inflation rate and very gently against deviations of the output gap 
with a delay. For its part, the CB has estimated a system of recurrent cycles, so that it would decide 
a more active monetary policy: it would increase the coefficient c1 that relates the inflation rate with 
the interest rate. Because the matrix of its system of equations indicates that the cycles become 
more cushioned as that value increases. Assuming that c1 takes a value of 15, for example, there is 
an improvement, although the agents do not agree about what is happening, and the monetary 
policy would not be optimal. 
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It is, of course, possible for the CB to rectify and add an objective for the output gap, until an 
optimal monetary policy is reached. But nothing guarantees that an agent includes unknown factors. 
 
In F model, the solution from learning is more complex. It would necessarily imply changes in the 
variables considered, because when the CB tries to estimate its fundamentalist model, it finds that 
the estimated equations have serious problems: there are estimated coefficients with an incorrect 
sign. 
 
Y = DDF Coefficient t Student 
X(1) = LAG1(DDF) 0.6384921 6.631 
X(2) = RATF 0.2925965 2.763 
N 20   
RSS 0.2045   
R2 0.9694   
R*2 0.9677   
 
After 20 simulated data, this problem makes clear to the CB that its model and its monetary policy 
both are erroneous. So finally it would be possibly forced to include the inflation variable, 
especially with a delay: it offers an optimal adjustment. 
 
This is possible, but not for sure. Economic agents can not find new variables, they can prove, but 
they can not find them inductively. Then the solution to the problem lies in breaking the assumption 
of limited knowledge. Imagination can cause new unknown factors to be introduced, but since it is 
not a matter of data perception or reasoning, the result is uncertain. “Intellectual intuition and 
imagination are most important, but they are not reliable” (Popper, 1962, p.28). 
 
Assuming that CB’s estimation includes a new variable, the logical question is: Would CB decide 
to modify your monetary policy?. Evidently yes, because the matrix has an eigenvalue greater than 
1, and the solution is explosive. However, controlling only the output gap can not reach equilibrium 
and must necessarily expand its objectives to include the inflation rate. If, for example, c2 = 0.5 and 
c1 = 1, then we can reach that equilibrium situation. 
 
In conclusion, in the first case analysed, learning would lead to a better situation. Although not 
optimal. In the other model, the analysis make agents know they are erroneous. The solution would 
imply breaching the assumption of limited knowledge, so that agents can spontaneously include 
relevant variables. There is not a necessary and rational process that leads with certainty to this 
innovation. Coordination between agents is desirable, but not a compulsory conclusion. 
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As a matter of fact, the situation in which the agents find themselves is that of omissions of relevant 
variables (e.g., Clarke, 2005, pp. 342 ss.). This is an unsolvable problem. In fact, to include new 
variables could not be a solution if there is a continuity of omitted variables. However, “by 
including additional control variables in our specifications, we could very easily be making the bias 
on the coefficient of interest worse”, and “knowing for sure requires knowing much more than we 
typically do in practice. In the absence of this kind of omniscience, we need an approach to 
achieving convincing experimental control that has fewer debilitating side effects” (op. cit., p. 350). 
Therefore, in this context of rational agents trying to establish the best decisions within the context 
of limited information available, the problem of omitted variables is very serious, and it can cause 
strong biases in predictions, and the consequent monetary policies mistakes. 
 
 
10. Conclusions.  
 
First, heterogeneous agents with uncertain expectations rules must be considered as a possibility to 
build models and crucially to design possible monetary policies. As De Grauwe (2008) says, the 
model builder can limit the rules that agents can use to make forecasts by “imposing the condition 
that forecasts must be consistent with the underlying model” (p, 6). It is compulsory to test the 
results when this condition is relaxed. 
 
Second, the New Keynesian model can generate explosive cycles when there are different agents 
forming expectations with different rules, and they have a situation of limited knowledge. That is, 
when they are not able to coordinate, even if they are rational and they try to learn from experience. 
Explosive cycles mean disequilibrium. 
 
Third, learning is not a solution, because there is not inductive or deductive procedure to rationally 
find omitted variables. It is possible, but not for sure. However, omitted variables are a consequence 
of different expectations rules. There is no certainty that a learning process can lead to determinate, 
stable and stationary solutions to the model.  
 
Fourth, the absence of determination in a New Keynesian model, in that situation, does not depend 
neither on random exogenous variables, nor on the formation of self-fulfilling expectations. The 
lack of coordination among agents, with limited knowledge and different expectations, can cause 
this situation. 
 
Fifth, the CB must follow active policies to control the inflation rate and the output gap, closely 
monitoring whether the result of the policies is a volatile situation or not. The reason is the 
economic agents may not be coordinating their expectations. This result is similar to Mitra and 
Bullard (2000) who contemplate indeterminate results when expectations are formed on delays.  
 
Sixth, I mentioned the open debate about the effectiveness of monetary policy regarding the output 
gap. The result obtained in this work is the CB should pursue active policies considering objectives 
both with respect to the inflation rate and the output gap. 
 
Monetary policy must be aware that it faces an uncertain economic system, with multiple agents 
pursuing hard-to-know objectives. And, for this reason, the CB should always contemplate the 
possibility that there are omitted variables, of difficult or impossible knowledge. I leave for 
successive works if that monetary policy should be one of commitment (rules), or it should resort to 
discretionary measures when considered necessary. 
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